The Serbian Ottoman War and the Russo-Turkish War
The first of many crises in the Balkans began in 1875, when Bosnia and Herzegovina rebelled against Ottoman rule. When Turkey refused to reform its governing structure, Serbia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 30 June 1876. Russia, based on its foreign policy of pan-Slavism, or allegiance between all Slavic peoples of eastern Europe, declared war on the Ottomans in 1877. Britain, interested in maintaining the balance of power and protecting its Mediterranean holdings, nominally supported the Turkish sultan. In February 1878, Sultan Abdul Hamid II of Turkey sought peace.
The Congress of Berlin
Otto von Bismarck of Germany hosted the peace conference, known as the Congress of Berlin. Britain, concerned that the balance of power would tilt in Russia’s favor, secured Constantinople in Ottoman hands, and kept the Balkans out of Russian hands and influence. This included creating a small, autonomous Bulgarian state, much smaller than Russia wanted, with Macedonia (which had initially been included in Bulgarian territory) returning to the Ottoman Empire. Bosnia and Herzegovina were turned over to Austria-Hungary, and Russia pledged to abandon its support of Serbian nationalism—all in the name of the balance of power. However, with Serbian claims disregarded, continued conflict lay in the future.
As a result of Russia’s obvious political losses at the Congress of Berlin, Russia abandoned its alliance with Germany in the Three Emperors' League. Bismarck, in turn, recommitted Germany and Austria-Hungary together in a Dual Alliance in 1879. In 1882, Italy was asked to join the Dual Alliance, thus converting it into a Triple Alliance that lasted until the beginning of World War I in 1914. The balance of power seemed to be working.
The Serbo-Bulgarian War
When, in 1885, the second Balkan crisis erupted in the form of a two-week war in between Bulgaria and Serbia, Russia threatened to occupy Bulgaria. Austria then stepped in, and when Germany supported Austria instead of Russia, the latter removed itself from all treaty obligations with Germany and allied itself with France in 1894. France, previously allied with Great Britain, cemented what would be known as the Triple Entente when it encouraged the signing of an Anglo-Russian understanding in 1907. The new balance of power now pitted Britain, France, and Russia against Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy.
The Balkan Wars
The third Balkan crisis took the form of two wars, like the first. In 1908, despite Russian objections, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina outright. Serbia and Russia believed that these Slavic lands should have been incorporated into a greater Serbian state, but Russia was forced to back down in the face of German pressure. Undaunted, Serbia took advantage of a weakened Turkey after a 1911-1912 conflict with Italy to increase its Balkan holdings in the First Balkan War, from 1912 to 1913, stripping the Ottoman Empire of much of its territory. Bulgaria, dissatisfied by the share of territory it received from the first war, declared war on Serbia in 1913, beginning the Second Balkan War. Even though the war lasted only a month, and with a Serbian victory, Serbia was still livid over both Austro-Hungarian support of Bulgaria and its continued dominance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, setting the stage for the spark that ignited World War I.
The Balance of Power and the Balkan Crises
Despite Europe’s best efforts to maintain the balance of power in the late 19th century, it still failed to keep the peace. There are two significant contributors to this failure: the ideals of liberalism and shifting power dynamics. Liberalism, defined as Europe did in the 19th century, championed national self-betterment, the perfectibility of man, and the discoverability of natural rules of conduct that all men could understand and follow. Not only did it serve to justify imperial conquest with the potential to “civilize” the native populations, but it also recognized war, limited and quick, as a legitimate form of foreign policy. Throughout the 19th century, wars were localized, spanned mere weeks, and were fought to preserve the balance of power. If that could be true of all war, the argument continued, war could serve both national and international good when fought properly, that is, when it was based on the discoverable natural rules of conduct.
However, the balance of power in 1914 differed greatly from the balance of power in 1870. The balance that immediately preceded World War I consisted of two armed camps, with Great Britain, France, and Russia on one side and Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy on the other. These permanent partnerships locked policymakers into “blank checks” of support for their allies in the name of preserving the precarious balance of power. This, in turn, permitted weak nations to act irresponsibly with the certainty that they would be defended by their more powerful partners, just as they did in the Balkans from 1874 to 1913.